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Foreign Policy in an Age of Globalization 
Iver B. Neumann 
 Introduction 
Foreign policy as we know it today emerged with the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in the 
18th century. Although factors such as the merging of the diplomatic and consular corps with 
the MFA from the first decades of the 20th century onwards, the growth in the number and 
size of state agencies and the proliferation of international organizations have changed foreign 
policy-making, foreign policy has kept its coherence as an object of study. The goal of this 
chapter is to think through the extent to which globalization is changing foreign policy. In 
order to do so, I draw on literatures on the state and on diplomacy. Globalization is 
understood as an intensification of relations between an increasing number of polities, both in 
the sense that relations become denser and in the sense that the speed of interaction increases. 
As with internationalization before it, this process cannot fail to challenge the importance of 
foreign ministries. The chapter ends with a discussion of how foreign ministries strike back by 
orchestrating the action of other types of entities. What takes place in the area of foreign 
policy is part of a wider shift in state practices, away from governing directly towards 
governing from afar. Foreign ministries join other parts of the state apparatus in governing 
through other state and also non-state entities.<xen>1</xen> 
The baseline 
In order to discuss the transforming force of globalization on foreign policy, we need a 
conceptualization of foreign policy that may serve as a base for comparison. Any policy may 
be ‘foreign’ in the sense that it aims to have an effect on something which is held to exist 
primarily outside ‘our’ political and legal sphere, however defined. There is a basic theoretical 
problem with using the term in this sense, however, and it is to do with the difference between 
hermeneutical terms (terms used in the social context analysed) and analytical terms (terms 
foreign to that context but useful to the analyst). In small-scale societies, as well as in large-
scale pre-modern societies, there is little to remind us of such a conceptual division between 
domestic and foreign. That division is dependent on a certain categorization of the world 
which only emerged in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries (Walker, 1992) The principle of 
sovereignty which emerged between territorially defined entities at that time only came to be 
expressed in institutionalized social practices at the end of the 18th century. During the late 
17th and most of the 18th century, it was not yet clear whether things were foreign in the 
older sense of falling outside the actual grasp of the king, or whether it was foreign in the 
sense of falling on the other side of a territorial border. 
Understood as a social phenomenon, foreign policy emerged simultaneously with 
foreign ministries (Neumann 2007a; Leira, forthcoming). The emergence of foreign ministries 
in Europe was part and parcel of a professionalization of policy-making overall. Another 
apposite element here was the codification of diplomacy which took place at the Congress of 
Vienna. After the Napoleonic wars, any political phenomenon had to be institutionally 
categorized as being either domestic or foreign. By the end of the 19th century, the role of the 
court in decision-making, which had remained an important factor in policy-making 
throughout the century, was seriously weakened. This was also the time when European states 
began to gather the diplomatic corps, the consular corps and the foreign ministries in one 
institution, called the foreign service. What we see today as the normal division between 
foreign and domestic policy is but a century old. 
The knowledge production of the state during high modernity was perhaps best 
captured by Weber in his ideal type of bureaucracy. Weber fashioned the ideal type in a series 
of methodological articles written at the very beginning of the 20th century. As he 
summarized the key idea in his posthumously published Economy and Society, 
For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all 
irrational, affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a 
conceptually pure type of rational action. […] in analyzing a political or military 
campaign it is convenient to determine in the first place what would have been a 
rational course, given the ends of the participants and adequate knowledge of all the 
circumstances. Only in this way is it possible to assess the causal significance of 
irrational factors as accounting for the deviations from this type. The construction of 
a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal 
type) which has the merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity. By 
comparison with this it is possible to understand the ways in which actual action is 
influenced by irrational factors of all sorts, such as affects and errors, in that they 
account for deviation from the line of conduct which would be expected on the 
hypothesis that the action were purely rational. (Weber [1904–1905], 1968, vol. I, 
p.6) 
Weber immediately goes on to specify that rationality is what we may call an analytical term, 
that is fashioned after the fact, for a scientific purpose, and not what we referred to above as 
hermeneutical terms. I note this here as a reminder of the absolute irrelevance of the ideal type 
to any actually existing social constellation as anything other than an analytical tool. A 
Weberian bureaucracy never existed. The reason why I evoke it here is simply as an ideal-
type baseline of how state policy – including foreign policy – was ideally (as opposed to 
actually) made during high modernity. A bureaucratized foreign policy should, at the very 
least, be made by a leadership distinct from the bureaucracy implementing it, it should act in 
uniform fashion in all events and it should follow written routines. 
The challenge to the existing institutional set-up 
Practitioners working in diplomatic services and scholars tend to agree that Weber’s ideal 
type has come under severe pressure. The state is a polity based on a particular territorial 
mode of organization. Weber saw it as a claimed monopoly on the use of physical force. 
Schumpeter saw it as a claimed monopoly on taxation. Durkheim saw it as a nexus of 
domination between a power elite and a spatially bounded society. These are all 
conceptualizations of a spatially defined area that at any given time remains the same, and 
that is clearly delineated. The delineations may vary over time and they may at any given time 
be contested, but the principle of delineation remains uncontested. By contrast, globalization 
inherently involves deterritorialization, hence it is an ipso facto challenge to the state. 
The newness of globalization cannot be linked to space alone, however. 
Deterritorialization is but one element of it; globalization entails two more crucial factors in 
addition to space. The first of these is time. The speed with which information and, to a 
slightly lesser degree, material objects can travel is rapidly increasing. The second factor is, to 
borrow a term from John Ruggie (1993), density. The density of flows of everything from 
persons (for example tourism, migration) to information (for example TV programmes, 
homepages on the internet) to goods is higher than ever. True, in the late 19th century the 
flow of goods was intense and increasing rapidly, but the relative flows of persons and 
information were limited. Furthermore, the total global population was significantly lower 
(something in the order of one in every ten human beings who has ever lived has done so in 
the post-World War II period), so in absolute terms the flows of persons and goods are 
absolutely unprecedented. This density has effects that are not only quantitative, but also 
qualitative, for it challenges the very ‘boundedness’ of the state. A polity may only be called 
bounded if a set of boundaries exists between that polity and other polities that is important in 
a sufficient number of contexts. Therefore, there exists a limit to how large the flows of 
information and material objects may be perceived to be before the polity is no longer thought 
of as bounded. Once the density of communication exceeds this threshold, the polity is no 
longer clearly territorialized. 
The flow of immigrants into the United States is substantial, as is the flow of 
information and material objects in and out of that state. The US government has reacted by 
thinking about territorialization in a new way. For example, it is taxing certain goods and 
services at the source and insisting on American jurisdiction over companies that are noted on 
American stock exchanges, regardless of their physical location. The US government is also 
imposing a certain number of deterritorialized practices, such as email surveillance. We 
would, nonetheless, hardly conclude that the United States is a deterritorialized state. But the 
changes are of such a magnitude and are increasing at such a pace that we may easily 
conceive of a situation in which the ‘density threshold’ is perceived to be surpassed. This 
clearly has implications for foreign policy. 
Globalization is a term for how space, time and the relationship between them 
reconfigures the world in which foreign policy is made, and puts the bureaucratic mode of 
knowledge production under heavy pressure. Time is compressed and, consequently, it takes 
more political energy to maintain the importance of space. Globalization thus understood is a 
continuation of internationalization, a term for how the centralization of foreign policy in each 
state went together with an increase in relations between them. Historically, 
internationalization emerged in tandem with foreign policy, as a principle that continuously 
threatened to undermine the categorization of policy into domestic and foreign. 
Institutionalization was already connected with intensifications of time and density. New 
technologies played a key role (for example the telegraph, the wire, the telephone). 
Internationalization eventually brought about key changes, including mounting pressure for 
state accountability, widening in state recruitment patterns and the emergence of international 
organizations. It is instructive to briefly consider how foreign policy was changed by these 
developments because it suggests ways in which foreign policy is challenged by globalization 
as well. 
Where accountability is concerned, the attempts of parliaments to survey and control 
foreign policy is paramount. These attempts are as old as foreign policy itself. Following 
tentative attempts within revolutionary France, the first parliamentary committee on foreign 
affairs emerged in the United States in the 1820s, followed by Great Britain, until, in the 20th 
century, parliaments everywhere had foreign committees. Concurrently, we have seen 
increased interest in foreign policy from the press and the media. The advent of international 
organizations, which began with functional organizations in the second half of the 19th 
century, continued with the founding of the League of Nations, only to multiply after World 
War II. It fell to foreign ministries to man the offices of the League, and they generally did so 
by drawing on people from their own ranks. Manning of international organizations continues 
to happen by delegation from and with the guidance of foreign ministries (Weiss, 1975). 
With globalization, there has been further increase in pressure concerning 
accountability, widening in recruitment patterns and international organizations. The pressure 
for accountability has not first and foremost taken the form of further calls for parliamentarian 
control, although there is patchy movement in this direction. The key change seems to 
concern relations with the media. Half a century ago, Marshall McLuhan pointed out that 
compression in time and space put speed of information at a premium and changed our ways 
of understanding the world: ‘[when] a new technology extends one or more of our senses 
outside us into the social world, then new ratios among all of our senses will occur in that 
particular culture. It is comparable to what happens when a new note is added to a melody’ 
(McLuhan, 1962, 41). 
It is journalists who are the principal composers of globalization. Gone are the days 
when journalists respectfully approached foreign ministries in the hope of picking up some 
treasured comment. Currently, journalists, diplomats and politicians are mutually dependent 
on one another. Ceteris paribus, it is the journalists that set the pace by breaking the news, 
and the others who react. In the Norwegian foreign ministry, morning meetings address the 
question of how to respond to headline news. Furthermore, while the media regularly decide 
to carry a story for days in a row, and so succeed in forcing the ministry into a defensive 
posture, the reverse is rarely the case. We should, of course, not totalize this trend. Any 
foreign ministry may still withhold information from the media that it deems to be particularly 
sensitive, and will continue to do so. During the Thatcher years, the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was able to play favourites with the journalists, and often denied 
access to overtly critical journalists to its daily briefings. Still, the trend remains clear and 
ubiquitous; the level of access for journalists which is considered ‘normal’ by all parties is 
rising. All this happens in the name of transparency. This norm is part and parcel of the state-
society model that is presently spreading across the globe, which means that as long as 
ministries and politicians do not take active measures to halt or reverse the trend it is set to 
continue. 
Since Americans like Benjamin Franklin and Tom Paine played a role in 
internationalization by casting themselves as diplomats of mankind, much has been made of 
the importance of ‘world society’ and ‘world opinion’. While world opinion is a social fact, it 
remains unclear how it should be conceptualized. Furthermore, it is not evident to what 
degree world opinion impinges on foreign policy outcomes. National public opinions are 
multifaceted and blurry as well, and we have endless examples of how political outcomes may 
run against them, but that does not stop them from acting as very real parts of any politician’s 
equation. For makers of foreign policy, who deal in changing peoples’ impressions of 
countries and of events, world opinion is of importance and it looms larger as space is 
compressed (for a particularly informative practitioner’s view, see Dickie, 2004). 
Globalization means that the question of information becomes a question of 
proliferating target groups. Together, politicians, spin doctors and diplomats conduct public 
diplomacy, once the curious preserve of Soviet diplomats. It primarily targets domestic media, 
but there are other targets as well. More resources are being spent on entertaining foreign 
journalists. The Canadian innovation of staging town hall meetings has begun to spread. 
Utilizing interactive arenas for discussing foreign policy on and off the internet is increasingly 
common and expected. Since it is hard to see how internet discussions could be limited to 
citizens, the nature of that medium may further open up space for non-citizen voices and so 
further blur the distinction between citizens and foreign nationals. Malleable geographical 
boundaries go together with malleable social boundaries. Briefly, the deepening and widening 
of accountability means that the importance of impression management has increased. 
The proliferation 
Globalization is characterized by a proliferation in the number of and kinds of agents that are 
pertinent to the making of foreign policy. If transcendence of boundaries is an effect of 
globalization, then the states system must increasingly be seen as only one part of the global 
political system. It follows that the state’s personnel must sooner or later take cognizance of 
the other kinds of polities that exist within the system. If negotiation and, more widely, 
mediation is a key to foreign policy, then the work of the state’s diplomats increasingly 
involves mediating  between a wider slate of agents than states. Diplomats used to mediate 
across state boundaries, but are now increasingly mediating across a plethora of different 
social and political boundaries. The domestic/foreign distinction is a correlate of state 
boundaries. If then state boundaries are relativized, so too is the domestic/foreign distinction. 
The distinction is increasingly hard to uphold, and it is becoming less relevant in an 
increasing number of contexts. 
The fact that diplomacy involves different kinds of agents is not new, and students of 
foreign policy have covered this terrain well. Beginning in the late 1960s, the ‘comparative 
foreign policy’ school detailed the challenge that other ministries posed to diplomatic services 
(Rosenau, 1969; Hermann et al., 1987). Some 20 years later, a small set of literature on sub-
state diplomacy began to emerge (Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Hocking, 1993; 
Neumann, 2002). What has drawn less attention is that, with increased density in international 
affairs and more hybridization, there is an increasing number of groups that look like 
functional equivalents of foreign ministries. International agency networks play an ever more 
important role (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). NGOs are evolving their own corps of quasi-
diplomats. So are transnational corporations (Stopford and Strange, 1991). Typically, 
however, the groups of people outside the diplomatic services that carry out equivalent 
functions do not handle the full gamut of diplomatic hese tasks. If we turn to the literature on 
diplomacy for guidance about foreign policy functions (in the sense of tasks), they are often 
said to be three: information gathering, negotiation and communication (Wight, 1977, 115–
117).<xen>2</xen> For example, any sizeable transnational firm will have people working on 
information gathering and communication as well as employing negotiators, but typically 
these are different people. Again, travel bureaus will have offices overseas representing them, 
but the people working there will be different from those who do their information gathering 
and their negotiation. If we look the functions taken together, it is still only MFAs that do 
them all. 
The fact that foreign ministries are still alone in fulfilling the functions of foreign 
policy tells us nothing about the impact of globalization on how those functions are being 
fulfilled, however. I would argue that the key way in which foreign policy decision-making 
generally, and MFAs specifically, have been changed by globalization lies exactly in the way 
these functions are now carried out by the state apparatus.<xen>3</xen> 
The state response 
The state apparatus was itself changed by internationalization. Internationalization meant that 
ever newer parts of the state apparatus began to undertake tasks of a transnational character. 
This had three immediate consequences. First, and this had already happened in the 1940s, 
there was an explosion in so-called summit diplomacy. Top politicians availed themselves of 
the shrinking of space and time to take foreign policy matters in their own hands. By rushing 
things to the top, summit diplomacy may serve as an example of how internationalization 
opened up possibilities (Dunn, 1996). A second consequence, which caught the attention of 
scholars from the late 1960s onwards, was the increase in international activity by ministries 
other than those of foreign affairs and defence. By the millennium, most Western ministries 
had an international department. A third consequence, much noticed in the 1990s, was that, 
particularly throughout the EU, prime minister’s offices (PMOs) played an increasingly 
important role in the shaping of foreign policy.<xen>4</xen> This was a logical consequence 
of the involvement of different ministries, a factor that begged for coordination. Since the role 
of other ministries vis-à-vis MFAs proved too strong for the MFAs to coordinate on their 
own, a new coordinating entity for foreign policy emerged – the PMOs. 
Foreign ministries were slow to adapt to these new trends. As demonstrated by the 
comparative foreign policy literature, the main impulse seems to have been that MFAs wished 
for the entire phenomenon simply to go away. At least in the case of some states, MFAs 
gambled that their prestige and experience would make them indispensable. This turned out to 
have been a misplaced gamble, as other ministries simply persisted in carrying out business 
without necessarily consulting the MFAs. 
To generalize, MFAs only really acknowledged the pervasive importance of 
globalization during the late 1990s (witness, for example, how the need to acknowledge 
globalization is not a key topic in any of the analyses of 12 national MFAs worldwide in 
Hocking, 1999). As seen from the MFAs, the key challenge was not only to concede the 
growing importance of other agents in foreign policy decision-making, but also to forge 
strategies to secure the MFAs as nodes in the networks of decision-making. In order to do 
that, MFAs had to ensure that the information they could provide remained of paramount 
importance for how these other agents defined their environment. Politicians in charge of 
foreign ministries as well as diplomats began to grasp that, in order to maintain a key role in 
foreign policy decision-making, they had to change their own organizations. Two principles 
of organization stood out as particularly ripe for rethinking; one was MFA hierarchy, the other 
the basic modus operandi. 
Hierarchy is a cherished principle of foreign policy-making, and in a number of ways, 
it is unavoidable. Clear communication spells coordination, and coordination spells some kind 
of hierarchy. The stronger the hierarchy, the more cumbersome the chain of command and the 
longer the reaction time. This means that globalization, which compresses time, is a direct 
challenge to hierarchy. New technologies play a dual role. On the one hand, these 
technologies have contributed to the density of flows that put hierarchy under attack. On the 
other hand, they favour hierarchy – emails may be used for commands and electronic texts 
make it easier for the top of the hierarchy to trim information right before it is released. As 
seen from the MFAs, the question was how to retain a key role, and the answer was to 
network their own organizations in order to increase the number of interfaces with other 
agents. This is being done by empowering employees to answer a wide range of questions 
from the outside and to take a wide range of new initiatives with relatively less preparatory 
work than before. This did not change the principle of hierarchy in any way – people who are 
out of line still get slapped down and the insubordinate are disciplined just as they used to be 
– but the subject matter to which hierarchy is applied shrunk dramatically. If an organization 
may speak with a thousand voices on a number of issues on which it used to be able to speak 
with only one, it spells increased action capacity. The network organization is simply a much 
more efficient model for fulfilling the key foreign policy function of information collection 
and dissemination under the conditions created by globalization than is the old megaphone 
model. Whereas the stirrings of such a change may be observed in a number of MFAs, it is of 
course hampered, first, by the resistance of senior diplomats, whose turn it is to be on top of 
old-fashioned hierarchical lines, to step aside in favour of the new principle of the network 
organization and, secondly, by the hierarchical bent of the broader foreign policy-making 
context. The more hierarchical the state in question, the less easy for its MFA to respond to 
globalization by introducing networked organization. 
A second consequence stemming from the range of polities is a proliferation of 
sources of information. As a result, the public struggle for defining reality intensified and 
foreign ministries were put at a disadvantage relative to their previous situation, where their 
information was often better and often inscribed with more authority than, say, press 
information or information from the ministry of transportation. Since journalists specialize in 
speed, diplomats have lost out on that particular score at least since the advent of the telegraph 
in the 1840s (Nickels, 2003). MFAs used to compensate for that by co-opting journalists and 
academics and furnishing them with authoritative information – authoritative because it came 
from the MFAs. The advent of globalization partly destroyed this bargain, since the 
importance of speed increased and the relative position of the MFAs weakened in such a 
degree that its information did not remain effortlessly authoritative. The Canadian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) was the first to implement the answer to 
this, namely to change its modus operandi from being reactive to events to being pro-active. 
There was organizational innovation to inform Canadian society, including town hall 
meetings. There were all kinds of exchange with other providers of information: scholarships 
for journalists and academics to spend time at DFAIT, swapping of personnel with other 
MFAs, planting own personnel in NGOs, and recruiting personnel from NGOs (Canada’s 
success with the landmine ban was partly due to the fact that DFAIT recruited activists like 
Mark Lawson to work in their ranks). When, on Robin Cook’s behest, the UK Foreign Office 
recruited Amnesty International’s former parliamentary officer to advise on human rights and 
a member of Save the Children to work on the rights of children, Cook went from soliciting 
advice to headhunting people. Cook also seconded people from the Foreign Office’s own 
human-rights department to Article 19 and to the Minority Rights Group (The Economist, 6 
March 1999). When Bernard Kouchner became foreign minister of France, he repeated the 
move (an easy one for him to make, coming as he did from Medicins sans frontièrs). At 
present, we find these practices, at least in embryonic form, in most Western MFAs. Here 
again, there is resistance from senior diplomats. Being pro-active means acknowledging to the 
competition that you are not indispensable. Therefore a prerequisite for pro-activeness is 
recognition of other social groups as something more than passive takers. Reaching out is, 
therefore, a move that acknowledges the competition propelled forward by globalization. It is 
not a move that comes easily to a generation of foreign ministry personnel that were juniors 
when MFAs gambled that they could simply ignore the stirrings of internationalization by 
pretending it did not exist. 
Conclusion 
Internationalization brought higher density of state-to-state relations; globalization brought a 
further increase in speed and a plethora of other agents with an interest in foreign policy-
making. The traditional key agents, the MFAs, are answering by changing their organizations 
into networked ones. What new kind of foreign policy decision-making does that make for? If 
there is an overall logic to the shift in political rationality under conditions of globalization, it 
is to do with a change from direct to indirect rule. There has been a move from direct to 
indirect governing, and indirect governing increasingly involves objects that are to be found 
beyond the boundaries of the state whose foreign policy tries to govern them. More is left to 
individuals, and control is growing more indirect, with direct control being increasingly 
reserved for after-the-fact situations when indirect control has turned out to be too soft to 
secure the desired result (Neumann and Sending, 2010). This logic is working its way into 
foreign policy-making as well. Consider the training of foreign ministry personnel to deal 
more independently with other kinds of agents. It hangs on indirect control being effective. 
By training its employees well in advance, the top of the organization sees to it that the 
answers given when the top does not listen will be within acceptable parameters. Direct 
control kicks in when this indirect strategy does not work out. Indirect rule also kicks in 
where pro-activeness is concerned. It is about orchestrating social situations in advance, in the 
hope that the outcome will be more favourable than it would otherwise have been. By 
employing indirect means, one may save the use of more direct means for a later point. 
Governing takes place from afar. But if one wants to govern from afar, then one needs to be 
far-sighted. A plan for the long haul is needed in order to consider different outcomes, to 
listen to second opinions and to have contingency plans. All this changes the faces of foreign 
policy. Foreign ministries join other parts of the state apparatus in governing through other 
state and also non-state entities. 
The shift in performing policy away from trying directly towards governing from afar 
is accompanied by a shift in the very meaning of the term foreign policy. Increasingly, foreign 
policy does not seem to refer to politics happening elsewhere, but to policy which involves 
different non-domestic agents and so call for MFA orchestration. This shift of meaning poses 
a challenge to linguistic practices which still presuppose that foreign policy is state policy 
oriented towards the outside of the state. States may not be able to monopolize the term 
foreign policy for much longer. 
<en-group type=“endnotes”> 
 
Notes 
<en><label>1</label> I should like to thank Gunther Hellmann, Knud Erik Jørgensen and 
other participants at the workshop on changing foreign policies in Frankfurt, 1–4 July 2010, 
for their comments.</en> 
<en><label>2</label> Bull (1977, 171–172) adds ‘minimisation of the effects of friction’ and 
‘symbolising the existence of the society of states’; this can be called smoothing and 
representation.</en> 
<en><label>3</label> In previous work (Neumann, 2007b) I have argued that, when left to 
their own devices, for reasons that are to do with how the work has been set up and how 
diplomats see themselves and their role in foreign policy-making, diplomats will produce 
nothing new. The issue here is different, namely how MFAs change. Until convinced 
otherwise, my hypothesis remains that it is the MFAs politicians who engender change.</en> 
<en><label>4</label> Yet another factor, specific to the EU, was the increasing importance 
of the EU itself for national foreign policy-making. That is a topic which will not be further 
considered here, but see Hocking and Spence (2006). 
</en> 
</en-group> 
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